Why CPG Promotions Destroy Value (And the Three Metrics That Prove It)
The sell-in scorecard measures the wrong thing; three numbers measure the right one.
The short version
- Most trade-promotion scorecards measure the wrong thing. They track volume uplift and report a gross return, which tells you what the scanner recorded, not whether the event made money.
- Three metrics settle it: the incrementality rate (how much of the uplift was genuinely new), the net incremental profit bridge (what is left after you fund the discount on the volume you would have sold anyway), and a true promotional return built on that profit. Most portfolios cannot produce all three.
- The arithmetic is unforgiving. Across four categories the academic decomposition put only about one third of a promotional bump down to genuine category expansion; the rest was brand switching and pull-forward.1 McKinsey's read is that 59% of promotions lose money globally, rising to 72% in the United States.2
- Plot every event on a 2x2 of return against incrementality and a portfolio splits into four quadrants. The hard conversation is about the worst one, the events that are negative on both axes, which on a large UK grocery library ran at roughly a fifth of all events.
- You do not fix this by cutting the trade budget. You fix it by moving money out of the value-destroying quadrant and into the events and the base demand that actually pay, which improves portfolio return without changing the total spend.
- The Monday move: pick your ten biggest events, compute incrementality and net incremental profit for each, and put the bottom two on the table for your next range review.
The scorecard that hides the hole
Walk into most trade-promotion reviews and you will see the same chart: volume during the promotion against volume before it, a reassuring spike, and a return number underneath. The spike is real. The return number is usually fiction, because it counts every unit sold at the deal price as if the promotion caused the sale.
It did not. A large part of any promotional bump is volume you would have banked anyway, pulled forward from next month or switched in from your own other packs. The academic decomposition that still anchors the field broke the bump into three roughly equal thirds: genuine category expansion, brand switching, and cross-period pull-forward.1 Only the first third is new money. Report the whole spike as incremental and you have not measured a result, you have measured your own optimism.
This is not a marginal accounting quibble. Trade promotion is one of the largest lines a consumer-goods company spends, commonly cited at 15 to 25% of gross sales, around 20% of revenue on McKinsey's read.62 A measurement gap on the biggest discretionary line on the profit and loss account is not a rounding error. It is the hole.
Why 2026 raises the stakes
For three years the hole was survivable because price was carrying growth and retailers were absorbing it. Both have changed. Retailers now push back hard on price, Carrefour pulled PepsiCo brands including Doritos and Quaker from shelves across France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium in January 2024 over price increases, and the trade money that used to smooth those negotiations is under the same scrutiny.7 At the same time the majors are pivoting to volume: Nestle moved to cut US prices by 1% in early 2025 to hold its shoppers, and Unilever has said that "topline growth with strong volume contribution is, and will be, our absolute priority."89 Volume that has to be defended with promotion makes the quality of that promotion the whole game. And the tooling to measure it has arrived, with AI-enabled revenue-growth platforms now live at the big consultancies and inside companies like Reckitt.10 The excuse that the data was too hard is expiring.
Metric 1: the incrementality rate
The first number is the share of the promotional uplift that was genuinely new demand rather than borrowed or subsidised. It is the metric the gross scorecard hides, and it is the one that most often turns a celebrated event into a loss.
Incrementality, in plain words
Incrementality is the share of a promotion's extra sales that are genuinely new, rather than sales you would have made anyway. When a deal posts a spike, that spike is three things mixed together: shoppers who would not have bought the category at all, shoppers switched from a rival brand, and your own shoppers buying now what they would have bought next month. Only the first group is new money. The academic decomposition that anchors the field puts each of the three at roughly a third, so only about a third of a typical bump is truly incremental. You discounted all of it. The incrementality rate is the number that tells you how much of that discount actually bought you something.
A practical minimum that practitioner teams hold to is simple: a healthy event clears more than 50% incrementality.5 Below that line, more than half the discount is funding sales you already had. Given that the academic baseline puts genuine category expansion at only about a third of the bump, clearing 50% takes a well-chosen mechanic on the right pack at the right depth, not a blanket feature.1
Metric 2: the net incremental profit bridge
The second number turns incremental volume into money, and it is where most events quietly die. Start from the gross profit on the genuinely incremental units. Then subtract the cost you carry on the whole promoted base: the discount you funded on the units that were never incremental, the trade allowance, the listing and display fees. What survives is net incremental profit, the only figure that belongs in a profit conversation.
The reason the bridge matters is that the subsidy scales with the baseline, not with the incremental volume. A deep cut on a high-baseline product can post a huge uplift and still lose money, because you paid the discount on a mountain of volume that was always going to sell to win a molehill of new demand. The bridge makes that visible in a way the uplift chart never will.
How a record uplift still loses money
Follow the bridge one step at a time and the trap shows itself. Start with the gross profit on the units that were genuinely new. Then subtract what you funded on everything else: the discount on the volume that was always going to sell, the trade allowance, the listing and display fees. The reason a celebrated event can still come out negative is that the subsidy scales with the baseline, not with the new demand. So if the pack already sells in large volume, then a deep cut hands the discount to a mountain of guaranteed sales, and then the handful of genuinely new units cannot cover that bill. A huge uplift on a high-baseline product is exactly where this happens. The uplift chart hides it. The net incremental profit bridge is the only view that shows it.
Metric 3: a return built on profit, not volume
Only now does a return number mean anything, because it sits on net incremental profit rather than gross promoted sales. Build it that way and the spread across a portfolio is brutal. McKinsey found that best-in-class promotions returned five times more than the least efficient ones, and that 59% of promotions lose money globally, a figure that climbs to 72% in the United States.42 NielsenIQ put it more bluntly still: over half of all trade promotions deliver little to no sales lift, which means much of the spend is simply wasted.3
Why 59 percent and 72 percent should change your calendar
These are not edge cases. On the published read, 59 percent of promotions lose money globally, and that climbs to 72 percent in the United States. So on a normal calendar, more events destroy value than create it, which means the average promotion is a leak, not an engine. The same work found that the best events returned five times more than the least efficient ones. That spread is the opportunity: the money to fund your good promotions is already sitting inside your bad ones. You do not need a bigger trade budget to fix this. You need to know which events fall on which side of the line, and most scorecards cannot tell you, because they measure uplift instead of profit.
Four quadrants, one hard conversation
Put every event on a 2x2 of return against incrementality and a portfolio sorts itself into four groups. Top right, high return and high incrementality, is where you want the money: keep and scale. High return but low incrementality is efficient subsidy, profitable but borrowed, so review the mechanic. Low return but high incrementality is genuinely building the category at a loss, sometimes worth it as an investment, usually a depth problem. And bottom left, negative on both axes, is the quadrant that should not exist: events that lose money and do not even buy you new shoppers.
That worst quadrant is rarely empty. On a large UK grocery promotion library of roughly 1,600 events, close to a fifth landed there, negative return and negative incrementality at once. Those are not underperforming promotions to optimise. They are promotions to stop. The conversation nobody enjoys, with the customer who has come to expect that event every year, is the single highest-return hour in the trade-planning calendar.
Six steps to a calendar that pays
The fix is a sequence, not a slogan. First, measure incrementality on every major event, not uplift; if you cannot, that is the project before any other. Second, build the net incremental profit bridge for your top events so the subsidy on baseline volume is visible. Third, place everything on the grid and name the stop quadrant out loud. Fourth, stop or rebuild the bottom-left events, accepting the short-term volume dip as the price of removing a loss. Fifth, move the freed money into the scale quadrant and into base demand, brand, distribution, pack, that grows volume you do not have to rent. Sixth, take the rebuilt calendar into the joint plan as a shared-profit case, not a depth concession. Done in order, portfolio return rises while the trade total stays flat.
The two ways to over-correct
Two failure modes wait on the other side. The first is cutting the trade budget across the board, which kills the scale-quadrant events along with the stop-quadrant ones and hands volume to the retailer's own label. The discipline is reallocation, not subtraction. The second is treating the grid as a one-time purge rather than a standing process; events drift across quadrants as competitors and shoppers move, so a portfolio that was clean last year is not clean now. Measure every cycle, or the hole reopens quietly while the scorecard keeps smiling.
References
- Van Heerde, Harald J., Peter S. H. Leeflang, and Dick R. Wittink. "Decomposing the Sales Promotion Bump with Store Data." Marketing Science 23, no. 3 (2004): 317-334. Across four store-level datasets, the promotional bump split into roughly equal thirds: category expansion, cross-brand switching, and cross-period pull-forward. pubsonline.informs.org
- "CPG companies worldwide invest about 20 percent of their revenue annually in trade promotions... 59 percent lost money globally, with the figure rising to 72 percent in the United States." McKinsey & Company, 2019. mckinsey.com
- "Over half of all trade promotions result in little to no sales lift, meaning manufacturers are ultimately wasting time and money." NielsenIQ, 2022 analysis on measuring trade-promotion effectiveness. nielseniq.com
- "Best-in-class CPG promotions returned five times more than the least efficient ones." McKinsey & Company, October 2019. mckinsey.com
- A greater-than-50% incrementality rate is the practitioner minimum for a healthy promoted event, the canonical TPO threshold below which more than half the discount funds non-incremental volume. McKinsey, on precision revenue growth management. mckinsey.com
- Trade promotion is widely cited at 15 to 25% of gross sales for consumer-goods companies, around 20% of revenue on McKinsey's read. TELUS Agriculture & Consumer Goods. telus.com
- Carrefour stopped selling PepsiCo products, including Doritos and Quaker, across France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain in January 2024 over price increases. BeverageDaily, 8 January 2024. beveragedaily.com
- Nestle said it would cut US prices by 1% in early 2025 to maintain its appeal with American shoppers. Fortune, April 2025. fortune.com
- "Topline growth with strong volume contribution is, and will be, our absolute priority, whatever the economic environment." Unilever Q1 2025 results call transcript. unilever.com
- AI-enabled revenue-growth-management platforms are now live across the major consultancies and inside operators, including Reckitt's RGMx programme built with McKinsey. McKinsey & Company. mckinsey.com
Keep going
Pair this with the lessons that build and grade a promotion the right way.
More from the blog
Why 1% More in Price Beats 5% in Volume. The lever that promotion is so often used to avoid, and why a point of price beats a mountain of bought volume.
The Great RGM Reset. Why getting promotion right matters more in 2026, as the industry shifts from price-led to volume-led growth.
The Squeezed Middle. What happens to a range when promotion has been doing the work that pack architecture should.